Suchergebnisse

Nenad Miscevic's Nationalism and Beyond: Introducing Moral Debate about Values (New York: CEU Press, 2001) is reviewed. Of the book's three parts, part 1 describes nationalism as a political program; part 2 discusses the relationship between culture, identity, & tradition; & part 3 proposes cosmopolitanism as an alternative to nationalism. The review focuses on Miscevic's debunking of the intellectual, political, cultural, & moral arguments advanced by proponents in favor of nationalism; the various arguments are presented & Miscevic's criticism is supported. It is concluded that the author's ethical-political argumentation against nationalism is very convincing, but his treatment of the relationship between the individual & society seems to be too general & perfunctory. 2 References. Z. Dubiel

The author reviews the interchange between Jurgen Habermas & John Rawls, published in The Journal of Philosophy in Mar 1995. Habermas's criticism of Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is constructive & immanent. Habermas raises three objections against Rawls's theory. The first is that Rawls's design of original position is not adequate to clarify & secure the standpoint of impartial judgment of the principles of justice. The second is that Rawls should make a sharper distinction between the question of justification & that of acceptance of a theory of justice. The third is that Rawls does not succeed in bringing the liberties of moderns into harmony with the liberties of pre-moderns. The first two of Habermas's objections reveal the main thought of his criticism of Rawls, which is that Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is substantive, not procedural, & therefore is wrong. The third of Habermas's objections refers to a consequence of Rawls's theory of a rigid boundary between the political & non-political identities of citizens. In his reply to Habermas, Rawls emphasizes two main differences between his own & Habermas's theory. The first is that Habermas's theory is "comprehensive," while Rawls's is "political." The is that Habermas uses as means of representation the situation of ideal discourse, which is a part of his theory of communicative action, while Rawls uses the original position. Rawls answers in turn Habermas' objections & defends his liberal theory of justice as fairness as substantive justice. Adapted from the source document.

The author reviews the interchange between Jurgen Habermas & John Rawls, published in The Journal of Philosophy in Mar 1995. Habermas's criticism of Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is constructive & immanent. Habermas raises three objections against Rawls's theory. The first is that Rawls's design of original position is not adequate to clarify & secure the standpoint of impartial judgment of the principles of justice. The second is that Rawls should make a sharper distinction between the question of justification & that of acceptance of a theory of justice. The third is that Rawls does not succeed in bringing the liberties of moderns into harmony with the liberties of pre-moderns. The first two of Habermas's objections reveal the main thought of his criticism of Rawls, which is that Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is substantive, not procedural, & therefore is wrong. The third of Habermas's objections refers to a consequence of Rawls's theory of a rigid boundary between the political & non-political identities of citizens. In his reply to Habermas, Rawls emphasizes two main differences between his own & Habermas's theory. The first is that Habermas's theory is "comprehensive," while Rawls's is "political." The is that Habermas uses as means of representation the situation of ideal discourse, which is a part of his theory of communicative action, while Rawls uses the original position. Rawls answers in turn Habermas' objections & defends his liberal theory of justice as fairness as substantive justice. Adapted from the source document.

The author presents Petitt's reaction to the central dichotomy that ensues from MacIntyre's thinking about politics on the borderline between the liberal thought (as the continuation of the Enlightenment) & the communitarian thought (Aristotelianism-inspired but characteristic of the anti-enlightenment, romantic tradition). Petitt considers that dichotomy mystifying, since it conceals other interesting alternatives, such as pre-liberal, republican political thought. He tries to prove the republican tradition worthy of serious consideration & claims that it can be evolved into a truly appealing political stance. The author concisely describes liberalism & communitarianism as seen by MacIntyre & Petitt. Then he goes on to describe republicanism, as seen by Petitt. And finally, the author lists critical objections to Petitt's description of republicanism due to which that political alternative does not seem as attractive as Petitt claims. Adapted from the source document.